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GENDER-SELECTIVE SERVICE: THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF
WOMEN AND THE DRAFT
Elizabeth Farrington*
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 1, 2016, President Obama became the first President
since Jimmy Carter1 (and the second sitting President ever) to publicly support requiring women to register for the draft: “As old barriers for military
service are being removed, the administration supports—as a logical next
step—women registering for the Selective Service.”2 Of course, that support
was largely symbolic; at the time his administration announced its support,
President Obama had fifty days left in office, and the 2016 Senate provision3
requiring women to register for selective service had already died in the
House.4
To be sure, the debate feels merely symbolic altogether. The United
States has not drafted a man into service since 1972, and the military has
been entirely voluntary since the Vietnam War.5 Comprising only those enlisted by their own volition, the U.S. Military remains the strongest in the
world.6 Even so, the U.S. Government has, at least for the time being, decided to keep selective service in its back pocket, should a situation arise.
But the debate itself is important to anchor the discussion surrounding
the role of women in the U.S. Armed Services, particularly following the
2016 election. While Secretary of Defense Panetta officially lifted the ban
* Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Helene White, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. J.D. 2016, University of Illinois College of Law; M.A. 2013, Old Dominion University; B.S. 2007, U.S. Naval Academy. This Essay was shaped, in large part, through my time
on active duty from 2007–2013. But the views expressed herein are mine alone and in no way
purport to represent the views of the U.S. Navy.
1. Transcript: Selective Service Revitalization Statement on the Registration of Americans for the Draft (Feb. 8, 1980), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=
32906.
2. Gregory Korte & Tom Vanden Brook, White House: Obama Supports Registering
Women for Military Draft, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2016, 5:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/politics/2016/12/01/obama-supports-registering-women-military-draft/90449708/
3. See infra note 9.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. Mark Thompson, America’s Last Draftee: “I’m a Relic,” TIME, (Feb. 7, 2009), htt
p://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1877943,00.html.
6. CREDIT SUISSE, The End of Globalization or a more Multipolar World?, 41 (Sep.
2015), available at http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=E
E7A6A5D-D9D5-6204-E9E6BB426B47D054.
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on women in combat in 2013,7 the GOP’s 2016 official platform sought “to
exempt women from ‘direct ground combat units and infantry battalions.’”8
Republicans in Congress kept step with the spirit of that policy. The Senate
passed the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which included a
provision for an all-gender draft, but the provision was removed by the time
the bill made it to the floor of the Republican-controlled House.9 The question of registering women for the draft would be left to the next Congress to
ignore or decide, one under Republican control that may plan to reinstate the
ban on women in combat roles.10 These two issues—women in combat roles
and women registering for the draft—are separate, but intrinsically linked. If
women remain eligible for combat positions, which they are as of the date of
this publication, Congress may be hard-pressed to find justification for excluding women from draft registration.11 This essay argues that requiring
women to register for the draft is not only the logical next step towards gender parity in the military; it is also absolutely required to remain faithful to
the Supreme Court’s gender discrimination precedent.
At many crucial points in our nation’s history, “in fundamental issues
of social fairness, the military has led the country in doing what is right.” 12
But not so with the role of women in the military. Exploring the progress of
women in uniform alongside that of their civilian counterparts, this essay
notes that the strides women in the military made—while incredible, and
rightfully lauded—were met with greater resistance. As the Supreme Court
was recognizing the need for increased scrutiny in gender discrimination
cases, women in uniform were being denied access to most rates and billets
in their respective service.13 Just as women finally seemed to be making
headway in gaining leadership positions, the United States sought to in7. Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, Pentagon Is Set to Lift Combat Ban for
Women, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/us/pentagon-saysit-is-lifting-ban-on-women-in-combat.html.
8. Jeff Daniels, Trump Could Nix Obama’s Women in Combat Military Policy, CNBC
(Nov. 14, 2016, 5:08 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/14/trump-could-nix-obamas-wo
men-in-combat-military-policy.html.
9. Compare S.2943, 114th Cong. § 591 (2016) (“National Defense Authorization Act”)
(Sec. 591(b)(1): “The duty to register imposed on male citizens and persons residing in the
United States by subsection (a) shall apply to female citizens of the United States and female
persons residing in the United States who attain the age of 18 years on or after January 1,
2018.”), with H.R. 4909,114th Cong. (2016) (enacted) (“National Defense Authorization
Act”) (provision removed). See Richard Sisk, Congress May Not Require Women to Register
for the Draft, MILITARY.COM (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.military.com/daily-news/2016/11/0
8/congress-require-women-register-draft.html.
10. Sisk, supra note 9.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, Jr., USA(ret.), Presentation: The Military and Public Behavior (Dec. 1997), http://www.upenn.edu/pnc/ptbecton.html.
13. See infra Part II.B.
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crease the size of the military and prepare for any number of real world scenarios that could escalate to World War III,14 but the executive and legislative branches disagreed on the best way to do so. President Carter reinstated
the draft with a provision to include women, but Congress elected to authorize the funds required to register only men.15
The decision to keep women from registering for the draft was immediately challenged and quickly made its way to the United States Supreme
Court. In Rostker v. Goldberg,16 the Court upheld the provision, showing
unwavering deference to Congressional findings despite the established intermediate scrutiny standard.17 In the years that followed, women in the
military had to overcome that stigma. With a little help from the Virginia
Military Institute, decades of slow, silent soldiering on culminated in 2013
when Defense Secretary Carter ended the combat exclusionary rule for
women and opened all military roles to women who qualify.18 The Supreme
Court may hear challenges in the coming terms regarding gender neutral
draft registration, with the architect of intermediate scrutiny now on the other side of the bench.
II. THE DIVERGING LIVES OF WOMEN IN AND OUT OF UNIFORM
The 1960’s and 70’s—the “second-wave” of feminism—saw the women’s movement, that had previously focused on suffrage and property rights,
broaden to include sexuality, workplace equality, and reproductive rights.19
Legal victories helped solidify the foundation for the movement, particularly
the Equal Pay Act,20 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,21 Title IX,22
and Griswold v. Connecticut, which struck down the state’s ban on contraception under the now widely applied right to privacy found in the “penumbras” and “emanations” of other constitutional protections.23

14. See infra Parts II.B., II.C.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
17. Id. at 83.
18. See Sisk, supra note 9.
19. See generally Cynthia Harrison, Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition
Building in the 1970s, in Feminist Coalitions, in FEMINIST COALITIONS: HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM IN THE UNITED STATES, 19 (Stephanie Gilmore
ed., 2008).
20. The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016)).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
22. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (June 23, 1972)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (1986)).
23. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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As the movement gained momentum on the civilian front, women
seeking to broaden their roles in the military found legal support as well.
President Johnson signed Public Law 90-130 in 1967, which opened advanced military ranks to women (including General and Admiral) and lifted
the two percent ceiling on the number of women in the military.24 Then in
1975, President Ford signed Public Law 94-106,25 authorizing women to be
admitted into the service academies.
Even so, the push for gender parity in the armed services was met with
greater opposition from both military and civilian leadership. While endorsing the law that opened advanced military ranks to women, the House
Armed Services Committee nevertheless stated: “There cannot be complete
equality between men and women in the matter of military careers. The
stern demands of combat, sea duty, and other types of assignments directly
related to combat are not placed upon women in our society.”26 The Committee further noted that “[t]he Defense Department assured [them] that
there would be no attempt to remove restrictions on the kind of military duties women will be expected to perform.” 27 General Hershey, former Director of the Selective Service System, echoed: “There is no question but that
women could do a lot of things in the military service. So could men in
wheelchairs. But you couldn’t expect the services to want a whole company
of people in wheelchairs.”28
It’s easy to view the long, slow road to military gender parity in a vacuum; fifty years after the Department of Defense “assured the committee”
that women would remain barred from the majority of billets, the DoD rescinded the combat exclusion and eliminated all gender-based barriers to
service.29 In three generations, women went from total exclusion to formal
parity. But women out of uniform faced an uphill battle as well and saw
faster, broader progress. While many of the causes second-wave feminism
fought for impacted women in uniform, there was no blueprint available for
challenging gender discrimination in the military before the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) invested in women’s rights and placed Ruth Bader
Ginsburg at the helm.

24. Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967).
25. Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (1975).
26. Report of the Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, in
VICTORIA SHERROW, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 24 (2007).
27. Id.
28. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L. J. 1533, 1533 n.5
(1973) (quoting Coye, The Restricted Unrestricted Line Officer: The Status of the Navy’s
Woman Line Officer, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. (1972).
29. See Bumiller and Shanker, supra note 7.
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Intermediate Scrutiny

While many second-wave feminist scholars view Betty Friedan or Gloria Steinem as the “mother of the movement,”30 Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s effort as Director of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project deserves praise in
its own right. Before Ginsburg argued for a higher standard of review for
statutes that distinguish between citizens on the basis of gender, the U.S.
Supreme Court had never found a gender classification unconstitutional.31
“Ginsburg recognized the need for a well-developed, long-range strategy to
chip away at precedent, to establish new principles incrementally, and to
pave the way for changing the law on gender discrimination.”32
Prior to Ginsburg’s time with the ACLU, the Supreme Court applied
two standards of review to analyze an Equal Protection challenge to a statute: “rational basis,” with maximum deference, or a “more stringent” test
that would later be known as “strict scrutiny.”33 The more stringent test derived from Justice Harlan Stone’s majority opinion in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.34 Nearly hidden in what would otherwise remain an “utterly
unremarkable” decision,35 Justice Stone noted that the deference afforded to
economic regulations—the “rational basis” test—was “inadequate when
dealing with fundamental rights, particularly in the case of ‘discrete and
insular minorities.’”36
Out of that footnote grew the “strict scrutiny” standard. In legislation
that does not implicate a fundamental right or a suspect class of “discrete
and insular minorities,”37 courts will uphold the law so long as there is a
rational basis for it.38 However, if the legislation implicates a fundamental
right or a “suspect class” of persons,39 courts will strike down the law unless
it is “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling government interest.”40 The
strict scrutiny test has primarily been applied to statutes that distinguish between persons on account of their race,41 but has also been used to strike

30. See Harrison, supra note 19 at 23.
31. Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20
U. HAW. L. REV. 699, 715 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 720.
33. Id. at 714.
34. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
35. See Elizabeth Farrington, Note, Federally Mandated Discrimination: The Irreconcilability of Civil Rights and Export Control, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 251, 277–78.
36. Id. at 278 (quoting United States v. Carolene, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
37. Id.
38. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152.
39. Id. at n.4.
40. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. See id.; See also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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down classifications based on religion,42 national origin,43 alienage (if the
classification is found in a state statute),44 and fundamental rights.45
For all the progress the movement made pressuring elected officials to
pass gender parity legislation,46 the laws were not rigorously enforced.47
Ginsburg thus “sought to challenge gender classification principles by educating the Court and the legal community of the changing roles of women.
Ginsburg’s initial step was ‘to awaken the Supreme Court and begin to persuade the court to take seriously the argument that sex-based classifications
[were] inherently suspect.’”48 The problem with applying the strict scrutiny
standard to laws that distinguish on the basis of gender is, first and foremost,
that women make up half of the population.49 While scholars may disagree
on what “discrete and insular minorities” means, most agree that women, as
a class, are not one.50 Even so, Ginsburg “skillfully crafted the pattern for
structuring her argument: focus on the strict scrutiny standard; identify the
government objective; challenge the assumption and/or overbroad generalization about women; compare the status of ‘similarly situated’ males and
females; and demonstrate the irrationality of the relationship between classification and government interest.”51
42. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
43. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
44. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
45. This term is usually understood to represent the rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Village
of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking down an ordinance requiring registration before
religious solicitors go door to door as violating the First Amendment). Of note, the First
Amendment has varying degrees of scrutiny depending on the type of speech that is involved;
for example, commercial speech receives intermediate scrutiny. See Cent. Hudson v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). But as a general rule, courts will apply strict scrutiny to
laws that impact an individual’s ability to exercise the “fundamental rights” – including but
limited to voting, reproductive freedom, and interstate travel. See Ellington et al., supra note
30, at 716 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)); Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630 (1969) overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
46. See supra, notes 18–22.
47. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 720.
48. Id. at 720–721 (citing Deborah L. Markowitz, Ruth Ginsburg: Women’s Rights
Advocate-Supreme Court Justice, 20 VT. B.J. & L. DIG., Oct. 1994, at 9); Jennifer S. Thomas,
Ruth Ginsburg: Carving a Career Path Through Male-Dominated Legal World, 51 CONG. Q.
WKLY. REP. 29, July 17, 1993, at 1876.
49. Age and Sex Composition: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (May 2011), https://www.ce
nsus.gov/prod/cen2010/ briefs/c2010br-03.pdf.
50. See Natalie Wexler, Sex Discrimination: The Search for a Standard, SUP. CT. HIST.
SOC., http://supremecourthistory.org/lc_womens_rights.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2017)
(“But women do not fit neatly into the Carolene Products mold of “discrete and insular minorities”: they are not discrete or insular, nor are they a minority.”).
51. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 722.
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In 1971, Ginsburg challenged an Idaho statute that created a preference
for men as administrators of estates.52 Because the “law assumed that men
had more business experience and were better qualified as administrators,”53
she argued that “the civil status of women was no longer subject to general
legal disabilities and sex, as an unalterable trait, should be considered a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.”54 Comparing sex
discrimination to segregation, Ginsburg focused her argument on the stereotypes of women often cited to justify discriminatory laws.55 The Supreme
Court was adequately persuaded, but not in the way Ginsburg hoped: it
struck down the law because it lacked a rational basis.56 The Court did not
adopt strict scrutiny to analyze laws distinguishing on the basis of gender.57
Ginsburg had another chance to convince the Court that heightened
scrutiny was required in gender discriminatory statutes just eighteen months
later. In Frontiero v. Richardson,58 Ginsburg challenged statutes providing
dependency benefits to all wives of servicemen, but not to all husbands of
servicewomen. Brilliantly, by challenging gender classifications that formally favored women, Ginsburg was able to highlight how longstanding stereotypes lack rational basis and detrimentally impact both men and women.59
The Court overturned the statute, but a plurality of only four Justices, led by
Brennan, voted to adopt strict scrutiny. The other members of the eightJustice majority followed Reed to strike down the statute under rational basis.60
Without a majority to support the application of strict scrutiny, Ginsburg began advocating for a middle ground—an intermediate standard of
review. Focusing on Social Security cases, where widowers received fewer
benefits than widows, and jury duty cases, where service was mandatory for
men and voluntary for women, Ginsburg found “mixed results.”61 In one
such social security case, a young woman died in childbirth and her widow52. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
53. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 723.
54. Gender and Legal History Paper Summary, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY, https://w
ww.law.georgetown.edu/library/collections/gender-legal-history/glh-summary.cfm?glhID=62
9544B9-D3C4-BA2A-1D1AB3EA82759959 (last visited May 26, 2017).
55. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 722–23.
56. Reed, 404 U.S. at 77.
57. Id.
58. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
59. Ginsburg also argued that this actually hurt women by relegating them to a dependent place in a man’s world. See Ellington et. al, supra note 31, at 729. But formally, this
statute placed a higher burden on men than women, and was thus viewed as more favorable
to female military spouses.
60. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 730 (citing Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678).
61. Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman’s Work to Change the
Law, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 335, 345–46 (1992).
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er became unemployed due to difficulty seeking childcare for his infant
son.62 The father obtained social security benefits, but the other available
“mother’s insurance benefits” were authorized for women only. 63 The Court
unanimously struck down the statute, finding that the challenged classification was indistinguishable from the statute in Frontiero64 and that “all parties were victims of invidious sex-discrimination.”65 Again, however, the
Court declined to formally adopt heightened scrutiny.
Less than one year later, that changed. The Supreme Court heard Craig
v. Boren, which challenged an Oklahoma law that allowed women to buy
certain beer after turning eighteen whereas men were not allowed to do so
until they turned twenty-one.66 The ACLU did not represent the plaintiffs,
but Ginsburg wrote an amicus brief arguing that sex classifications should
be subject to heightened, though not necessarily strict, scrutiny and writing
that “sex classification could not be justified on any basis.”67 The Court
agreed. The majority found the law violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it was not shown to be “substantially related to [the] achievement of
the statutory objective.”68 That has now become the “intermediate scrutiny”
standard—a law that distinguishes between individuals on the basis of sex
must be “substantially related” to an “important government objective.”69
Due in large part to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, just five years after the Supreme Court first struck down a statute that classified individuals on the
basis of sex, the intermediate scrutiny standard became precedent.
B.

Wearing the Stripes, Earning the Salute

On one hand, comparing the legal and societal progress of women in
and out of uniform during the 1970’s should be straightforward—like comparing apples to apples that sometimes wear an orange peel. As just one
example, Frontiero challenged statutes providing dependency benefits to all
wives of servicemen, but not to all husbands of servicewomen.70 Invalidating that statute impacted many women, but it specifically impacted women
62. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 (1975).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 653.
65. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 733. Ginsburg wrote that the majority of Justices
“thought it was discrimination against the woman as wage earner . . . . A few thought it was
discrimination against the man, because he didn’t have the same opportunity to give personal
care to the baby . . . . And one, [Chief Justice Rehnquist], thought it was discrimination
against the baby.”
66. 429 U.S. 190, 191–192 (1976).
67. Ellington et al., supra note 31, at 735 (citation omitted).
68. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
70. 411 U.S. 677, 690–691 (1973) (plurality opinion).
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in uniform who are married to a non-military spouse. But the hierarchy in
place within the U.S. Armed Forces provides a legal and administrative system all its own. As a result, many of the women seeking to challenge discriminatory practices or policies in the military had to do so through administrative channels, often without the benefit of counsel and without the opportunity to find public support.71 Even so, the comparison is useful in setting the stage for legislative and judicial response to the question of women
and the draft.
Although President Johnson lifted the two percent ceiling on the number of women in the military in 1967,72 each respective branch of the military could “prescribe the authorized strength of female enlisted and officer
personnel.”73 This stymied any effect lifting the ban might have had. In
1973, the Secretaries of each branch chose to limit the number of female
service members to less than two percent of the total service personnel.74 By
choosing to employ so few females compared to their male counterparts, the
military was able to place more stringent demands on female applicants.
Specifically, men could enlist at age seventeen, whereas women had to be
older than eighteen.75 Women with dependent children had to obtain a waiver to enlist, which was not required of male enlistees.76 Women also needed
to achieve higher scores on mental aptitude tests and had to possess higher
educational certifications than their male counterparts.77 Although barred
from service specialties that require “heavy” labor, let alone combat, the
minimum physical standard was more stringently applied to women than
men as well.78
What is striking about those standards, of course, is that the United
States was actively drafting young men into military service at that time. 79
The U.S. Military thought it was better served by drafting men into service
than accepting more women who were volunteering to join. There is no data
available on which to argue the United States could have avoided a draft had

71. See generally JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
(1992).
72. Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat. 374 (1967).
73. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1539 (citing 10
U.S.C. §§ 3209, 3215, 8208, 8215 (1970)).
74. See Id. (citing Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on the Utilization of Manpower in the Military of the House Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 12439
(1972)).
75. Id. at 1539 n.41 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 505 (1970)).
76. Id. at 1540 & n. 46 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 1540 & n.42 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 1540 n.44–45 (citations omitted).
79. The Vietnam Lotteries, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, https://www.sss.gov/About/Hist
ory-And-Records/lotter1 (last visited February 9, 2017).
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they allowed more women to enlist, but eighty-five percent of military billets were noncombatant, even at the height of the Vietnam war.80
Whether it was the result of the decision to end the draft and shift to an
all-volunteer military force (AVF), the influence of the larger women’s
movement, or some combination of the two, women made tangible progress
throughout the latter half of the 1970’s towards military gender parity.81
Without the draft, the Department of Defense increased recruiting goals for
women; by 1976, one in every thirteen recruits was female (compared to one
in thirty just four years prior).82
One of the most institutionalized barriers women faced was the opportunity to serve as an officer in the military. Female candidates for Army
Officer Candidate School (OCS) needed two years of college and a mental
aptitude score of 115; male candidates needed only a high school diploma or
equivalent and an aptitude score of 110.83 Direct appointments to a number
of officer positions in the Navy and Marine Corps were statutorily limited to
males84 and the military’s ROTC program only opened to women in 1970,
and even then, was “available only on a limited, experimental basis.”85
For that reason, Public Law 94-106, which mandated female admission
to the three major service academies (Army at West Point, Navy at Annapolis, and Air Force at Colorado Springs), was a monumental victory for
women in the military.86 The first women entered the service academies in
80. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1541 (citing 118
CONG. REC. S4390 (daily ed. March 21, 1972)).
81. See 1970’s: The Decade, THE WOMEN’S MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial.
org/history/detail/?s=1970sthe-decade (last visited February 4, 2017).
82. Id.
83. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1542 & n.53 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 1542 (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 5575, 5576, 5577, 5587 (1970)).
85. Id. at 1542 & nn.57–58 (citations omitted).
86. See Act of Oct. 7, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat. 531 (1975). The law provided:
Sec. 803. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the administration of
chapter 403 of title 10, United States Code . . . (relating to the United States Military Academy), chapter 603 of such title (relating to the United States Naval
Academy), and chapter 903 of such title (relating to the United States Air Force
Academy), the Secretary of the military department concerned shall take such action as may be necessary and appropriate to insure that
(1) female individuals shall be eligible for appointment and admission to the service academy concerned, beginning with appointments
to such academy for the class beginning in calendar year 1976, and
(2) the academic and other relevant standards required for appointment, admission, training, graduation, and commissioning of female
individuals shall be the same as those required for male individuals,
except for those minimum essential adjustments in such standards
required because of physiological difference between male and female individuals.
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1976 and, unsurprisingly, were swiftly met with strong opposition.87 But
crucially, despite opposition both on and off campus, women were admitted
to service academies and would be eligible to receive a commission through
the academy starting in 1980.88
With the service academies set to produce more female officers, the
military found itself considering the billets these women would be eligible
to fill. The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) had passed and was pending
ratification.89 No one knew whether the ERA would be ratified or what effect it might have on the role of women in the military. It was never ratified,90 but some of the steps taken by the military indicate that leadership
expected some formal mandate regarding the billets women could fill and
opted to proactively “open-up” a number of roles to women.91
Weapons training became mandatory for women92 and both the Army
and Navy allowed women to enter pilot training.93 For the first time, a woman was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General.94 The U.S. Coast Guard
reviewed the need for permanent female officers and found that, while there
was “[n]o need for regular women officers . . . Nevertheless, considering all
factors, it is in the overall best interest of the Coast Guard to begin a controlled women officer program with provisions for integration into the regular Coast Guard included.”95 The report concluded: “Planning and execution

Id.
87. See generally SHARON
THE NAVAL ACADEMY (2013).

HANLEY DISHER, FIRST CLASS: WOMEN JOIN
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88. See Id. (describing the conditions for the first class of female midshipmen at the
Naval Academy); see also James Webb, Jim Webb: Women Can’t Fight, WASHINGTONIAN
(Nov. 1, 1979), https://www.washingtonian.com/1979/11/01/jim-webb-women-cant-fight/
(“There is a place for women in our military, but not in combat. And their presence at institutions dedicated to the preparation of men for combat command is poisoning that preparation.
By attempting to sexually sterilize the Naval Academy environment in the name of equality,
this country has sterilized the whole process of combat leadership training, and our military
forces are doomed to suffer the consequences.”).
89. Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon, & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Why the Era Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 116 (1997).
90. See Thomas H. Neale, The Proposed Equal Rights Amendment: Contemporary Ratification Issues, CON. RES. SERV., 8–11 (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.equalrightsamendment.org/
misc/CRS%20ERA%20report%204-8-14.pdf.
91. See generally HOLM, supra note 71.
92. See 1970’s: The Decade, THE WOMEN’S MEMORIAL, http://www.womensmemorial
.org/history/detail/?s=1970sthe-decade (last visited February 4, 2017).
93. Id.
94. Sarah Begley, This Woman was the First Female General in the U.S. Armed Forces,
TIME (June 11, 2015), http://time.com/3916073/anna-mae-hays-female-general/.
95. Women & the U.S. Coast Guard: Moments in History, U.S. COAST GUARD,
https://www.uscg.mil/history/uscghist/womenchronology.asp (last visited February 1, 2017).
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of a women officer program in the Coast Guard is overdue.”96 Each branch
welcomed female officers and enlisted personnel into its respective intelligence community,97 along with other restricted line specialties like the Judge
Advocate General Corps (JAG).98 While women were not yet allowed on
warships, female Sailors were assigned to service craft.99 The courts helped
too; in 1976, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the Marine
Corps policy of involuntarily discharging pregnant Marines violated the Due
Process Clause.100
Although many rates and billets in each service remained closed to female service members, the tide had changed. Women were carving out a
significant place for themselves in the military across all branches and
ranks. In the context of the larger women’s movement, with the support of
President Carter (a Naval Academy graduate),101 the barriers to gender parity
in the military seemed to be falling.
C.

Rostker v. Goldberg: The Pendulum Stops

As noted above, following the national fatigue brought on by the Vietnam War, the United States discontinued the draft in 1975.102 But just five
years later, President Carter felt the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed “a
serious threat to a region that is vital to the long-term interests of the United
States and our allies.”103 It represented:
the first time since World War II that the Soviets have used their military
force to invade an independent nation outside the sphere of the Warsaw
Pact. This brutal act of aggression has called forth the condemnation of
the whole world—and a series of firm and measured responses from the
United States.104

Thus, President Carter re-established the Military Selective Service
System (MSSS) in the event that the United States needed to reinstate the
draft itself: “Registration . . . will improve our capacity, if circumstances
96. Id.
97. See James L. Leuci, Navy Women in Ships: A Deployment to Equality, NAVAL
HISTORY, https://www.history.navy.mil/content/dam/museums/hrnm/Education/Women%20i
n%20Ships%201978%2020160207.pdf (last visited February 12, 2017).
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d 1114, 1126 (2nd Cir. 1976).
101. See generally HENRY CARROLL, JIMMY CARTER: A BIOGRAPHY (2016).
102. See generally MITCHELL K. HALL, VIETNAM WAR ERA: PEOPLE AND PERSPECTIVES
(1st ed. 2009).
103. Selective Service Revitalization Statement, supra note 1.
104. Id.
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require, to increase the size and strength of our Armed Forces—and that
capacity will itself help to maintain peace and to prevent conflict in the region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia.”105
Crucially, President Carter recommended that the Act be amended so
that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) extended to include women:
My decision to register women is a recognition of the reality that both
women and men are working members of our society. It confirms what is
already obvious throughout our society—that women are now providing
all types of skills in every profession. The military should be no exception. In fact, there are already 150,000 women serving in our Armed
Forces today, in a variety of duties, up from 38,000 only 10 years ago.
They are performing well, and they have improved the level of skills in
every branch of the military service.
There is no distinction possible, on the basis of ability or performance, that would allow me to exclude women from an obligation to
register.106

President Carter’s recommendations to reinstate the MSSA and to include women in the registration were then sent to Congress, who would
need to pass funding for MSSA registration.
The issue was considered extensively in hearings, committee, and debate. In fact, debate over Carter’s recommendations “dominated Congress
for months, until Congress passed on June 25, 1980 . . . a statute funding
registration for men only.”107 Nearly every analysis of the Rostker decision
noted below nods to these extensive debates, largely due to the Court’s reliance on such “careful consideration and debate.108 But as at least one scholar
noted:
In fact, the debate about Carter’s proposal was not a break with the past,
and fit smoothly within over a decade of debate over women’s military
roles. In 1980, powerful governmental and popular voices[—]whether
for or against Carter’s proposal[—]remained determined to limit women’s military service in ways designed to maintain and enforce women’s
place in the family and civilian employment. 109

Nevertheless, after such debate, Congress passed and President Carter
signed into law Pub. L. 96-282.110 The exclusion of women was immediately
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Jill Elaine Hasday, Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and Extrajudicial Constitutional Change, 93 MINN. L. REV. 96, 115 (2008).
108. See infra note 111.
109. Hasday, supra note 107 at 116.
110. Act of June 27, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-282, 94 Stat 552.
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challenged through a previously stayed case. The U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with the plaintiffs that the exclusion
violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 Stayed by Justice Brennan (then
Circuit Justice for the Third Circuit),112 the U.S. Supreme Court took the
appeal immediately.
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist reversed the district court’s
decision.113 The Court noted the intermediate scrutiny standard, but didn’t
appear to apply it with the same rigor it had been using: “The Court has
struck down laws that discriminate on the basis of sex unless they are ‘substantially related to an important governmental interest.’ While Justice
Rehnquist referred to that standard in his opinion, his overriding theme was
that of judicial deference to the will of Congress.”114 That was not a controversial legal analysis; the opinion explicitly noted that “[t]he case arises in
the context of Congress’ authority over national defense and military affairs,
and perhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.”115
To be sure, raising and supporting an army for the national defense116 is
an important government interest; no one in the case argued otherwise. But
with the increased breadth of roles women filled in the armed services by
1981, the Court’s decision to give what seems like rational-basis level deference to the findings of Congress suggests that issues involving women in
the military have a different standard altogether.117 Moreover, the decision
fails to scrutinize the relationship between that interest and classification
involved.
Justice Rehnquist seemed satisfied that, because women were barred
from combat, registering only men was “substantially related” to the interests served in drafting service members. Yet, as noted above and outlined in
the briefings for this case, less than fifteen percent of military roles were
111. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev’d, 453 U.S. 57
(1981).
112. “Ironically, though he had earlier stayed the ruling of the lower court, Justice Brennan concurred with Justices White and Marshall in dissenting from the Court’s reversal of the
lower court ruling.” Gilbert L. Purcell and Janet Rappaport, Rostker v. Goldberg: A Step
Backward in Equal Protection, or a Justifiable Affirmation of Congressional Power?, 9 PEPP.
L. REV. 2 441, 445 n.33 (1982) (citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981)).
113. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83
114. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 6-3, Rule Draft Registration May Exclude Women, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/26/us/justices-6-3-rule-draftregistration-may-exclude-women.html.
115. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64–65.
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
117. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66 (Distinguishing from previous gender discrimination
cases by noting that “Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and greater
flexibility” in matters involving the military).
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combatant.118 When the district court heard the case it “did not agree that the
justifications offered by the Government for an exclusively male draft registration were substantially related to the achievement of any important governmental interests.”119 In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted the same issue:
[A] gender-based classification cannot withstand constitutional challenge
unless the classification is substantially related to the achievement of an
important governmental objective. . . . Consequently, before we can sustain the MSSA, the Government must demonstrate that the gender-based
classification it employs bears ‘a close and substantial relationship to
[the achievement of] important governmental objectives.’ 120

Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and White, felt the government had not shown—as would be its burden under intermediate scrutiny—that drafting only men bore a close and substantial relationship to its
objectives. To the contrary, Justice Marshall felt “there simply is no basis
for concluding in this case that excluding women from registration is substantially related to the achievement of a concededly important governmental interest in maintaining an effective defense.”121 Marshall noted with incredulity the notion that Congress felt it needed to exclude women rather
than amend the Act to authorize drafting different numbers of men and
women or drafting into noncombatant roles (which it already did).122 He
concluded that:
neither the Senate Report itself nor the testimony presented at the congressional hearings provides any support for the conclusion the Court
seeks to attribute to the Report—that drafting a limited number of women, with the number and the timing of their induction and training determined by the military’s personnel requirements, 123

would burden military objectives in administration or training, as the
Government challenged.
So why didn’t the Court adhere to the intermediate scrutiny standard it
established just a few years prior and continues to apply today? The opinion
tends to signal that, when it comes to national defense, women are (potential) service members first and women second. That is, because deference to
the legislature seems to be at its peak on matters of national security and
118. The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, supra note 28, at 1541 (citing 118
CONG. REC. S 4390) (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1972).
119. Purcell and Rappaport, supra note 112, at 445 (citing Goldberg, 509 F. Supp. at
605).
120. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 87–88 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 90.
122. Id. at 110–11.
123. Id. at 111.
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defense,124 the Court may not really apply traditional scrutiny standards.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion seems to signal—at least for the Rostker majority—that was the case.125
III. SOLDIERING ON: REVISITING ROSTKER AND THE ROAD FORWARD
Some thirty-five years later, Rostker “continues to be significant.”126
Opponents of military gender parity cite Rostker not only to “validate[] the
combat exclusion, [but also to] extend[] the influence of the policy and the
idea.”127 By excluding women from registration, Congress, and eventually
the Supreme Court, seemed to state “that every man, regardless of any disability, must register, but that all women, regardless of competency, cannot.”128 This reinforced “the myth that all men are more competent than all
women.”129
That sentiment remains, albeit far less prevalent.130 Societal reticence
notwithstanding, the legal justifications cited in Rostker no longer hold water. Although no challenges to the draft on the basis of gender discrimination
have reached the Supreme Court since Rostker, all evidence seems to suggest the current Supreme Court would reverse course. And the Court may
have such an opportunity: two lawsuits have already started to make their
way through the courts. In February 2016, the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of
the National Coalition for Men, who challenged the exclusion of women
from the draft on the grounds that it is a violation of Equal Protection.131 The
124. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion) (recognizing the power of the U.S. Government to detain U.S. citizens deemed enemy combatants).
125. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 66. (“[w]hile the members of the military are not excluded from
the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections.”). But
see id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he phrase ‘war power’ cannot be invoked as a
talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can be brought
within its ambit. ‘[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.’”).
126. MEGAN MACKENZIE, BEYOND THE BAND OF BROTHERS: THE US MILITARY AND THE
MYTH THAT WOMEN CAN’T FIGHT 37 (2015).
127. Id. at 40.
128. Linda Greenhouse, Women Join Battle on All-Male Draft, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22,
1981), http://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/22/us/women-join-battle-on-all-male-draft.html.
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., Nicholas Clairmont, The Unseemly Death of an Amendment to Draft Women, ATLANTIC (May 20, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/theunlikely-birth-and-unseemly-death-of-an-amendment-to-draft-americas-women/483599/;
D.C. McAllister, Threats of Drafting Women Reveal the Lies of Equality, FEDERALIST (Feb.
8, 2016), http://thefederalist.com/2016/02/08/threats-of-drafting-women-reveal-the-lies-of-eq
uality/.
131. Kaitlin Sandin, Women and the Draft: Is the House Delaying the Inevitable?, GEO.
SECURITY STUD. REV. (Sept. 25, 2016), http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2016
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case is currently being reconsidered by the district court. Additionally pending is Kyle v. Selective Service, a case brought by a 17-year-old girl suing
for the right to legally register for the Selective Service.132
A gender-neutral draft is the logical next step considering the evolving
roles of women in the military. Notably:
The first woman to command a U.S. Navy warship did so in 1990. In
1991, women were cleared to fly fighter jets in combat; two years later,
Congress authorized women to serve on combat ships at sea. 1998
marked the first female fighter pilots to fly combat missions off of an
aircraft carrier. The first women to command a U.S. Navy warship and
U.S. Air Force fighter squadron were given their commands in 1998 and
2004, respectively. By 2010, women were cleared to serve aboard submarines. According to the Army, by September 2015 ‘437 women
earned awards for valor to include two Silver Stars, three Distinguished
Flying Crosses, 31 Air Medals, and 16 Bronze Stars.’ As Secretary
Carter noted, between the 2013 memorandum and the 2015 policy
change, we also saw ‘women soldiers graduate from the Army’s Ranger
School.’133

Since the combat exclusion has been lifted, the argument that the United States only drafted men for combat positions lacks even a tangential relationship to the stated goals of selective service registration. That said, the
GOP’s 2016 official platform sought “to exempt women from ‘direct ground
combat units and infantry battalions.’”134 While this platform seems to be in
contention with military leadership,135 and even in contention with some
prominent Republicans,136 it is worth considering the fate of women and the
draft in the event that the ban on women in combat is reinstated.
/09/25/women-and-the-draft-is-the-house-delaying-the-inevitable/ (citing Nat’l Coal. for Men
v. Selective Serv. Sys., 640 F. App’x 664 (9th Cir. 2016)).
132. Id.
133. Russell Spival and Adam Aliano, Should Women Register for Selective Service? The
Legacy of Rostker v. Goldberg, LAWFARE (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.
com/should-women-register-selective-service-legacy-rostker-v-goldberg (citations omitted).
134. Jeff Daniels, Trump Could Nix Obama’s Women in Combat Military Policy, CNBC
(Nov. 14, 2016, 5:08 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/14/trump-could-nix-obamaswomen-in-combat-military-policy.html.
135. For an overview of the studies conducted and policy decisions made prior to lifting
the combat exclusion, see Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Carter in the
Pentagon Briefing Room (December 3, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts
/Transcript-View/Article/632578/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-secretary-carterin-the-pentagon-briefi.
136. See Sandin, Women and the Draft, supra note 131 (noting that Sen. John McCain
(R-AZ) and Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) support mandating gender-neutral
registration). Although that support was offered prior to the November 2016 election, neither
Senator McCain nor McConnell have issued any contrary statements.
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Should that occur, the result should still be the same: the justifications
for excluding women from the draft no longer remain. “[W]omen serve—
and die—in combat, as the [] war in Iraq has amply demonstrated.”137 Even
before the Obama Administration pushed to lift the combat ban, women
were “barred from an unprecedentedly small and steadily decreasing number
of military positions, and only by military regulation rather than statute.
Public opinion surveys find markedly increased support for women’s military service, including in combat.”138
Immediately following Rostker, “several lawyers for feminist organizations that participated in the case said they thought the majority’s rationale
signaled a retreat from the special ‘scrutiny’ that the Court has applied to
sex discrimination issues in the last five years.”139 But in a symmetry not
often found in the legal world, those lawyers would be proven decidedly
wrong fifteen years later when the architect of intermediate scrutiny, now
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, wrote for the majority in United States v. Virginia.140 If Rostker represented the low water mark for intermediate scrutiny,
United States v. Virginia seems to represent the inverse.141 Writing for the
majority, Justice Ginsburg applied “skeptical scrutiny,”142 seemingly the
version of intermediate scrutiny Justice Marshall envisioned in his Rostker
dissent.
At the time the case was heard, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI)
only admitted men.143 This state-run facility (thus left unchanged after the
federal service academies integrated women) was gender segregated. The
state wished to avoid an Equal Protection challenge by opening a separate
facility for females, the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership
(VWIL).144 The state produced evidence surrounding the “adversative method” employed at VMI, which it believed could only accommodate male students.145 Justice Ginsburg’s decision demanded more justification and afforded less deference to VMI. Channeling years of litigation spent in pursuit
of heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination, Ginsburg wrote:
137. Hasday, supra note 107, at 97 (citations omitted).
138. Id.
139. Greenhouse, Justices, supra note 114.
140. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
141. See Anita K. Blair, U.S. v. Virginia: The New and Improved Equal Protection
Clause, CIV. RTS. PRAC. GROUP (The Federalist Soc’y for Law & Pub. Policy Studies) (May
1, 1997), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/us-v-virginia-the-new-and-improved-equ
al-protection-clause.
142. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
143. Id. at 520.
144. Id. at 526–27. It is worth noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of the Rostker
opinion, concurred in this case. He declined to join the majority’s reasoning, because he felt
the VWIL could have avoided violating the Equal Protection Clause with adequate funding.
145. Id. at 527–28.
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’Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Sex classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for particular economic disabilities [they have] suffered,’ to ‘promot[e] equal
employment opportunity,’ to advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation’s people. But such classifications may not be
used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and
economic inferiority of women. 146

Within that context, the Court found that “Virginia ha[d] shown no
‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ for excluding all women from the
citizen-soldier training afforded by VMI.”147
Twenty years later, the arguments for excluding women from selective
service registration fail within the context of today’s female service members and fail under this standard. “The transformation in women’s military
status has undermined Rostker’s foundation, making restrictions on women’s military service that Rostker did not explain because they seemed so
commonsensical now demand explanation and appear constitutionally vulnerable.”148 There is no longer a viable, let alone exceedingly persuasive,
justification for this exclusion.
IV. CONCLUSION
Even in the current geopolitical climate, there is nothing to suggest the
United States will draft any citizen into military service ever again. Yet
Congress still debates (or taunts)149 the registration of women for selective
service and males must register within thirty days of their eighteenth birthday. This classification is based on sex and, just as the statutes Ruth Bader
Ginsburg challenged, seems to favor women: those women who want to
serve still can but those that do not wish to do so do not risk being drafted.
But if there ever was an exceedingly persuasive justification for the exclusion, it flew out the window of a female-piloted F-14 decades ago. And
what’s more, the exclusion does not favor women, particularly those within
the service: by excluding women from registration, Congress reinforces the
harmful stereotype “that every man, regardless of any disability, must register, but that all women, regardless of competency, cannot.” 150 This myth—
that all men are more competent than all women—”may not be used, as [it]
once [was], to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 533–34 (citations omitted).
Id. at 534.
See Hasday, supra note 107, at 103.
See Clairmont, supra note 130.
Greenhouse, supra note 128.
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of women.151 Whether Congress amends the law or the Court strikes down
the gender discriminatory draft, a change is required and overdue.

151. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (citations omitted).

